Abstract-Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a significant security challenge for CyberPhysical Systems (CPSs) due to APTs' stealthy, dynamic and adaptive nature. The proactive dynamic defense provides a strategic and holistic security mechanism to increase costs of attacks and mitigate risks. This work proposes a dynamic game framework to model the long-term interaction between the stealthy attacker and the proactive defender. The stealthy and deceptive behaviors are captured by the multistage game of incomplete information, where each player has his own private information unknown to the other. Both players act strategically according to their beliefs which are formed by multistage observation and learning. The solution concept of Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) provides a useful prediction of both players' policies because no players benefit from unilateral deviations from the equilibrium. We propose an iterative algorithm to compute the PBNE and use Tennessee Eastman process as a benchmark case study. Our numerical experiment corroborates the analytical results and provides further insights into the design of proactive defense-in-depth strategies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE recent growth of automation, Internet of Things (IoT), and cloud services has accelerated the pace of integrating computing and communication functionalities with components in the physical world, which constitutes Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). The cyber integration increases the operation efficiency of the physical system, yet also creates a number of security vulnerabilities. First, connectivity and openness have expanded the attack surface and provided adversarial users with more access points. For example, an attacker can compromise components connected to the targeted assets through cyber or physical networks with the goal of data breaches and physical damages. Second, the component heterogeneity, the functionality complexity, and the large scale of CPSs have also created zero-day vulnerabilities and made the defense more costly.
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are one of the emerging threats for CPSs. Unlike the automated probes and amateurish hackers, APTs have specific targets and conduct thorough research to expose the system architecture, valuable assets, and even defense strategies so that attackers can tailor their strategies and invalidate the cryptography, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems. APTs are also deceptive and can stealthily stay in the system for a long time. One recent example of APTs is Stuxnet, which has aimed to compromise Iran's nuclear system by changing the centrifuges' rotor speed once a month for years. Meanwhile, Stuxnet has used replay attacks to disguise the attack as the equipment aging [1] . Proactive defense in depth is a useful class of strategies to defend against such sophisticated attacks. The proactive defense strategically designs a security mechanism prior to an attack to increase the cost of attacks and mitigate potential losses. The defense in depth, on the other hand, employs a holistic approach to protect assets across the cyber-physical layers, taking into account interconnections and interdependencies of these layers. Hence the design of proactive defense-indepth strategies provides efficient cross-layer protection that deters attacks and reduces cybersecurity risks.
To develop a formal design paradigm, we leverage game-theoretic methods to capture constraints on the defense, consequences of attacks, and attackers' incentives quantitatively. In particular, we propose a multistage game framework to model the long-term interaction and stealthiness of APTs. We divide the entire life cycle of APTs into multiple stages where at each stage, both players take actions, make observations, and then move to the next stage. Fig. 1 illustrates the multistage structure of a common APT kill chain [2] . During the reconnaissance phase, the threat actor probes the system and obtains intelligence from open-source or inside information. The reconnaissance phase identifies vulnerable targets and increases the success of the initial compromise. After APTs obtain the private key and establish a foothold, they escalate privilege, propagate laterally in the cyber network, and finally either access confidential information or inflict physical damages. The chain structure of APTs can be mapped into a game of multiple stages, where each stage describes a local interaction between the attacker and the defender where the outcome leads to the next stage of interactions. The goal of the APT is to reach the targeted physical assets while the defender aims to take actions at multiple stages of the kill chain to thwart the attack or reduce its impacts. One key challenge of the game-theoretic framework is to capture the stealthy and deceptive behaviors in the network. In this work, we use the multistage game of incomplete information [3] to model the information asymmetry between players. To this end, we introduce the notion of types to characterize the private information of the players in the game. On one hand, the type of users, legitimate or adversarial, is unknown to the defender because of the stealthy nature of APTs. On the other hand, the level configuration of the network, which can be low or high, is unknown to the users or the attackers when the network administrator hides or obfuscates her type via defensive deception techniques such as the moving target defense and the honeypot deployment. Players' types determine their utilities and affect their behaviors. Thus, each player observes and analyzes behaviors of the other player at each stage to form a belief of the other's type. When observations are available during their persistent interactions, players continuously update their beliefs via the Bayesian rule.
Both players act strategically according to their beliefs to maximize their utilities. The PBNE provides a useful prediction of their policies at every stage for each type since no players benefit from unilateral deviations at the equilibrium. The computation of PBNE is challenging due to the coupling between the forward belief update and the backward policy computation. We first formulate a mathematical programming problem to compute the equilibrium policy pair under a given belief for a onestage Bayesian game. Then, we extend this approach to compute the equilibrium policy pair under a given sequence of beliefs for multistage Bayesian games by constructing a sequence of nested mathematical programming problems. Finally, we combine these programs with the Bayesian update and propose an efficient algorithm to compute the PBNE.
The proposed modeling and computational methods are shown to be capable of hardening the security of a broad class of industrial SCADA systems. This work leverages the Tennessee Eastman (TE) process as a case study of proactive defenses against APTs that can infiltrate into the cyber network through spoofing emails, then escalate privileges, tamper the sensor reading, and decrease the operational efficiency of the TE process without triggering the alarm. The dynamic games approach offers a quantitative way to assess the risks and provides a systematic and computational mechanism to develop proactive and strategic defenses across multiple cyber-physical stages of the operations. First, we observe that defense at the final stage is usually too late to be effective when APTs have been well-prepared and ready to attack. We need to take precautions and proactive responses in the cyber stages when the attack remains "under the radar" so that the attacker becomes less dominant when they reach the final stage. Second, the online learning capability of the defender plays an important role in detecting the adversarial deception and tilting the information asymmetry. It increases the probability of identifying the hidden information from the observable behaviors, threatens the stealthy attacker to take more conservative actions, and hence reduces the attack loss. Third, defensive deception techniques are shown to be effective to increase the uncertainties of the attacks and their learning costs and hence reduce the probability of successful attacks.
A. Related Work 1) APT Defense and Security Games: Detecting APTs is challenging. US companies in 2018 have taken an average of 197 and 69 days, respectively, to detect and contain a data breach [4] . Previous works have focused on detecting APTs with the network traffic analysis [5] , [6] , white-listing [7] , and a context-based framework [8] .
As an alternative to these detection methods, security game models [9] , [10] , [11] have provided quantitative risk management frameworks that allow the system to prepare for attacks proactively. FlipIt game [12] models the key leakage under APTs as a private takeover between the system operator and the attacker. The FlipIt focuses on the optimal timing for resource allocations, however, oversimplifies the interaction of defenders with different types of users/attackers at different yet interdependent stages. Our game framework models heterogeneous adversarial and defensive behaviors at multiple stages, which is capable of predicting attack moves and losses based on the equilibrium analysis. Other works extend FlipIt game for the APT defense by integrating FlipIt with other components such as the signaling game to defend cloud service against APT [13] , another player to model the insider threats [14] , and a system of multiple nodes under limited resources [15] .
2) Cyber Deceptions and Incomplete Information Games: Cyber deception is an emerging research area. Games of incomplete information are natural frameworks to model the uncertainty and misinformation introduced by cyber deceptions. For example, strategic attackers in [16] manipulate the attack data to mislead the defender in finitely repeated security games.
To combat adversarial deceptions where the deceiver is the attacker, a defender can also initiate defensive deception techniques [17] such as perturbations via external noises, obfuscations via revealing useless information, or honeypot deployments. A honeypot which appears to contain valuable information can lure attackers into isolation and surveillance. A system can also disguise a real asset as a honeypot to evade attacks [18] .
3) Preliminary Version: The preliminary version of this work [19] has considered a dynamic game with onesided incomplete information where attackers disguise as legitimate users. This work extends the framework to a two-sided incomplete information structure where primitive systems can also disguise as sophisticated systems. The new framework enables us to jointly investigate deceptions adopted by both attackers and defenders, and strategically design defensive deceptions to counter adversarial ones. We also develop new methodologies to address the challenge of the coupled belief update in a generalize setting without the previous assumption of the beta-binomial conjugate pair. In the case study, we investigate heterogeneous actions and cyber stages such as web phishing and privilege escalation, whose utilities are no longer negligible. Moreover, we leverage the TE process with new performance metric and diverse attack models to validate the proposed proactive defensein-depth strategies and the efficacy of learning and defensive deceptions.
B. Notations
Common notations used in this paper are described as follows. For any finite set A , the cardinality of the set is |A |. 
C. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the multistage game with incomplete information and three equilibrium solution concepts are defined in Section III. To compute these equilibrium, we construct constrained optimization problems and an iterative algorithm in Section IV. A case study of TE process under APTs is presented in Section V with results in Section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. DYNAMIC GAME MODELLING OF APT ATTACKS
In this section, we introduce the multistage Bayesian game to model the dynamic interaction between the user P 2 (pronoun 'he') and the system defender P 1 (pronoun 'she') under incomplete information.
A. Games of Incomplete Information
The stealthy, persistent, and deceptive features of APTs result in incomplete information to the defender. APT attackers can disguise their subversive actions as legitimate behaviors so that the defender cannot distinguish an APT attacker from a legitimate user. A proactive defender can also apply defensive deceptions and introduce incomplete information to the attacker.
The Bayesian game [3] describes this double-sided incomplete information where the private information associated with P i is denoted by a discrete random variableθ i that has a finite support set Θ i . The true value or the realized value of the random variableθ i is called P i 's type θ i . Players knows their types yet not others' types. In our application, a user's type θ 2 is either adversarial θ b 2 or legitimate θ g 2 . The defender's type θ 1 can either be sophisticated θ H 1 or primitive θ L 1 . However, both players' types can also be non-binary, e.g., θ 1 distinguishes systems with different kinds of vulnerabilities and θ 2 distinguishes attackers with different targets.
B. Multistage Transition
Since APTs have specific targets at the final stage, going back to previous stages does not bring benefits. Therefore, the multistage attack graph has a tree structure without jumps or loops as shown in Fig. 1 . We use a multistage game with a finite horizon K to model the attack graph of APTs. At each stage k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K}, P i takes an action a k i ∈ A k i from a finite and discrete set A k i . We define m k i := |A k i | as the number of actions P i can take at stage k and specify the discrete action set as
The action a k i represents the observable behavior associated with P i , e.g., 'sensor access' for the user and 'sensor monitoring' for the defender. Since the other player P j of different types θ j can take the same action a k j , P i cannot directly identify the true type of P j with the observation of action a k j . In addition, the same action taken by P i of different types can lead to different consequences. For example, a sensor access from a legitimate user benefits the system yet the access from a pernicious user inflicts a loss. Besides, the loss is slight to a sophisticated system θ H 1 but considerable to a primitive system θ L 1 . Thus, in Section II-D, the stage utilities are taken to be dependent on both players' actions as well as their types.
Both players' actions up to stage k constitute the
A¯k i . Given history h k at the current stage k, players at stage k + 1 obtain an updated history
At each stage k, we further define a state x k ∈ X k as the smallest set of quantities that summarize information about actions in previous stages so that the initial state x 0 ∈ X 0 and the history at stage k uniquely determine x k through a known state transition function f k , i.e.,
The state can represent the location of the user in the attack graph, and also other quantities such as users' privilege levels.
C. Behavioral Strategy and Belief Update
at stage k to a probability distribution over the action space A k i . The action is a realization of the behavioral strategy, or equivalently, a sample drawn from the probability distribution σ k i (·|I k i ). With a slight abuse of notation, we denote σ k i (a k i |I k i ) as the probability of P i taking action a k i ∈ A k i given the available information I k i ∈ I k i . Note that the values of the other player's type θ j and action a k j , which are not observable for P i at stage k, do not affect
Since the other player's type is of private information, P i forms a belief b k i : I k i → (Θ j ), j = i, on P j 's type using the available information I k i . Likewise, given information I k i ∈ I k i at stage k, P i believes with a probability b k i (θ j |I k i ) that P j is of type θ j ∈ Θ j . At the initial stage k = 0, the only information available is the player's type realization, i.e., I 0 i = {θ i }. We assume that P i has a prior belief distribution b 0 i (·|θ i ) based on the past experiences with the other player. If no previous experiences are available to P i , P i can take the uniform distribution as an unbiased prior belief.
The information structure plays a vital role in decision making and the belief update. We present three different information structures I k i at stage 0 < k ≤ K as follows. 1) Perfect Recall with Real-time Observations: If we assume that the system has a perfect recall I k i = H k × Θ i , then players can update their beliefs according to the Bayesian rule:
Here, P i updates the belief b k i based on the observation of the action a k i , a k j . When the denominator is 0, the history h k+1 is not reachable from h k , and a Bayesian update does not apply. In this case, we let b
2) Perfect Recall with Delayed Observations:
The deceptive and stealthy characteristics of APTs may cause a delay τ ∈ {1, 2, · · · , K − 1} in the action observation. At stage k ≤ τ, there is no new information available for
} and the Bayesian belief update is given as follows:
3) Markov Belief: When players do not have perfect recalls, the information set is taken to be
With the conditional independence of σ k 1 and
where the set A x k+1
} contains the action pairs that change the system state from x k to x k+1 . Equation (3) shows that the Bayesian update in (2) can be obtained from (1) by clustering all the action pairs in the set A x k+1
x k . Thus, the Markov belief update (2) can also be regarded as an approximation of (1) using action aggregations. Unlike the history set H k , the dimension of the state set |X k | does not grow with the number of stages. Hence, the Markov approximation significantly reduces the memory and computational complexity.
The following sections adopt the Markov belief update in (2) . For every given state x k ∈ X k , we can use a type-dependent probability vector
D. Stage and Cumulative Utility
At each stage k, P i 's stage utilityJ k i :
× R → R depends on both players' types and actions, the current state x k ∈ X k , and an external noise w k i ∈ R with a known probability density function ϖ k i . The noise term models unknown or uncontrolled factors that can affect the value of the stage utility. The existence of the external noise makes it impossible for P i , after reaching stage k + 1, to infer the value of the other player's type θ j based on the knowledge of the input parameters x k , a k 1 , a k 2 , θ i , together with the output of the utility functionJ k i at stage k. Denote the expected stage utility as
Since two players' action sets are discrete, for each state
Given the type θ i ∈ Θ i , the initial state x k 0 ∈ X k 0 , and both players' strategies σ
i from stage k 0 to K, we can determine the expected cumulative utility U k 0 :K i for P i , i ∈ {1, 2}, by taking expectations over the mixed-strategy distributions and the P i 's belief on P j 's type, i.e.,
III. PBNE AND DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
The APT attacker and the defender use the Bayesian update to reduce their uncertainties on the other player's type. Since their actions affect the belief update, both players at each stage should optimize their expected cumulative utilities concerning the updated beliefs, which leads to the solution concept of PBNE in Definition 1. 
When ε = 0, the two ε-equilibria are called Dynamic Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (DBNE) and Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE), respectively.
PBNE is a refinement of DBNE with the requirement of the belief consistency property. When the horizon K = 0, the multistage game of incomplete information defined in Section II degenerates to a one-stage (static) Bayesian game with the one-stage belief pairs (b K 1 , b K 2 ) and the solution concept of DBNE/PBNE degenerates to the Static Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (SBNE) in Definition 2.
The sequential rationality property in (5) guarantees that unilateral deviations from the equilibrium at any states do not benefit the deviating player. Thus, the equilibrium strategy can be a reasonable prediction of both players' multistage behaviors. DBNE strategies have the property of strongly time consistency (STC) because (5) holds for any possible initial states, even for states that are not on the equilibrium path, i.e., those states would not be visited under DBNE strategies. The STC property makes DBNE adapt to unexpected changes since it can tolerate trembling hand errors. Solutions obtained by dynamic programming naturally satisfy STC. Hence, in the following, we introduce algorithms based on dynamic programming techniques.
Define
as the utility-to-go from any initial stage k 0 ∈ {0, · · · , K} under the DBNE strategy pair (σ * ,k 0 :K 1
, σ * ,k 0 :K 2
). Then, at the final stage K, the value function for player i ∈ {1, 2} with type θ i at state x K is
For each given state x K at the final stage K, we can also represent (6) in a compact matrix form with Q K i , the vector form of the behavioral strategy, i.e.,
For any feasible sequence of belief pairs
we have the following recursive system equations for P 1 and P 2 to find the equilibrium strategy pairs (σ * ,k 1 , σ * ,k 2 ) backwardly from stage K − 1 to the initial stage 0, i.e., ∀k ∈ {0, · · · , K − 1}, ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2}, j = i,
If we assume a virtual termination value
we can obtain (6) by letting stage k = K in (7). The second term in (7) represents the immediate stage utility and the first term represents the expected utility under the future state
Since a k i affects both terms, players should adopt a long-term perspective and avoid myopic behaviors to balance between the immediate utility and the expected future utility.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL ALGORITHMS
In IV-A, we formulate a constrained optimization problem to compute SBNE and V K i for the one-stage game. The SBNE and the optimization problem are represented in compact matrix forms. In IV-B, we use the proposed optimization problem as building blocks to compute DBNE and V k i , ∀k ∈ {0, K − 1}. Finally, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve for the PBNE. Efficient algorithms to compute PBNE lay a solid foundation to quantify the risk of cyber-physical attacks and guide the design of proactive defense-in-depth strategies.
A. One-Stage Bayesian Game and SBNE
Since both players' actions at stage k = K only affect the immediate utility J K i and there is no future state transition, we can treat the final-stage game at each state x K ∈ X K as an equivalent one-stage Bayesian game with the belief b K i and obtain the solution concept of SBNE. Definition 2: A pair of mixed-strategies (Q * ,K
With the type-related policy pair (Q * ,K
players have made contingency plans on how to react to different realized types. In Theorem 1, we propose a constrained optimization program C K to compute the SBNE. We suppress the superscript of K without any ambiguity in one-stage games.
Theorem 1: A strategy pair (Q * 1 (θ 1 ) ∈ Γ m 1 , Q * 2 (θ 2 ) ∈ Γ m 2 ) constitutes a SBNE to the one-stage bi-matrix Bayesian game (J 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 ), J 2 (θ 1 , θ 2 )) under a private type θ i ∈ Θ i , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, and a belief b i , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, if and only if the strategy pair is a solution to C K :
where α 1 (θ 1 ), α 2 (θ 2 ) are any strictly positive and finite numbers, and s 1 (θ 1 ), s 2 (θ 2 ) are scalar variables. The optimal solutions exist and are achieved at the equality of constraints (a), (c),
, where
are the game values of P 2 and P 1 , respectively.
Proof 1: Proof: The finiteness and discreteness of the action and the type spaces guarantee the existence of SBNE in mixed-strategy [20] , which further guarantee that program C K has solutions. To show the equivalence between the solution to C K and the SBNE, we first show that every SBNE is a solution of
Constraints (a) and (c) imply a non-positive objective function of C K . Since the value of the objective function achieved under this quadruple is 0, this quadruple is also optimal.
Second, we show that
The solution of C K should satisfy all the constraints, i.e.,
In particular, if we pick
Combined with the fact that the optimal value is achieved at 0, the inequality in (10) turns out to be an equality and equation (9) becomes (8) , which shows that (Q * 1 (θ 1 ), Q * 2 (θ 2 )) is a SBNE. Theorem 1 focuses on the double-sided Bayesian game where each player P i has a private type θ i ∈ Θ i . To accommodate the one-sided Bayesian game where P i 's typeθ i ∈ Θ i becomes common knowledge, we can modify program C K by letting α i (θ i ) > 0, α i (θ i ) = 0, ∀θ i =θ i , and α j (θ j ) > 0, ∀θ j ∈ Θ j , j = i.
B. Multistage Bayesian Game and PBNE
From (7), we can see that at stages k = K, each player optimizes the sum of the immediate utility J k i and the utility-to-go V k i . Thus, we can replace the original stage utility J K i in program C K with V k i + J k i in program C k to compute DBNE in a multistage Bayesian game.
Theorem 2: Given a sequence of beliefs b k i (·|x k , θ i ) for each player i ∈ {1, 2} at each stage k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K − 1}, a strategy pair (σ * ,0:
) constitutes a DBNE of the K-stage Bayesian game under double-sided incomplete information with the expected cumulative utility U 0:K i in (4), if, and only if σ * ,k
2 (x k , θ 2 ) are the optimal solutions to the following constrained optimization problem C k for each k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K − 1}:
Similarly, α 1 (θ 1 ), α 2 (θ 2 ) can be any strictly positive and finite numbers, and
) is a sequence of scalar variables. The optimum exists and is achieved at the equality of constraints (a), (b), i.e., s * ,k
The proof is similar to the one for Theorem 1. Here, variables σ k i are shorthand notations for P i 's strategy, which can be represented by a finite dimensional vector
By letting stage k = K and V K+1 i = 0, program C K for the static Bayesian game is a special case of C k for the multistage Bayesian game.
We can solve program C k+1 to obtain the DBNE strategy pair (σ . Then, we apply V k+1 i in program C k to obtain a DBNE strategy pair (σ k 1 , σ k 2 ) and the value of V k i . Thus, for any given sequences of type belief pairs b k i (·|x k , θ i ), ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K}, we can solve C k from k = K to k = 0 recursively to obtain the DBNE pair (σ * ,0:
). 1) PBNE: To this end, given a sequence of beliefs, we can obtain the corresponding DBNE via C k in a backward fashion. However, given a sequence of policies, both players forwardly update their beliefs at each stage by (2) . Thus, we need to find a consistent pair of belief and policy sequences. As summarized in Algorithm 1, we iteratively alternate between the forward belief update and the backward policy computation to find the PBNE. We resort to ε-PBNE solutions when the existence of PBNE is not guaranteed.
Algorithm 1 provides a computational approach to find ε-PBNE with the following procedure. First, both players initialize their beliefs b k i (·|x k , θ i ) for every state x k at stage k ∈ {0, 1, · · · , K}, according to their types θ i . Then, they compute the DBNE strategy pair σ * ,0:K i , ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
Compute DBNE strategy σ * ,k , ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, via the Bayesian update (2) . If the strategy pair σ * ,0:K−1 i
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, satisfies (5) under the updated belief, we find the ε-PBNE and terminate the iteration. Otherwise, we repeat the backward policy computation in step two and the forward belief update in step three.
V. CASE STUDY
This section studies an industrial control system under the APT attack where the attacker stealthily initiates infection and escalates privileges in the cyber network, yet launches attacks on the physical plant as shown in Fig. 2 . We use the TE process as a benchmark to show that attackers can strategically compromise the SCADA system to decrease the operational efficiency of a physical plant without triggering the alarm.
As defined in II-A, we adopt the double-sided binary type space Θ 2 = {θ b 2 , θ g 2 } and Θ 1 = {θ H 1 , θ L 1 } for the user and the defender, respectively. The sophisticated system θ H 1 represents a well-trained defender with a high security-awareness of the network. The bi-matrices in Table I , II, and III represent both players' utilities at three stages, respectively. In these matrices, P 1 is the row player and P 2 is the column player. Each entry of the matrix corresponds to players' payoffs under their action pairs, types, and the state. In particular, the two red numbers in the parenthesis before the semicolon are the payoffs of P 1 , P 2 , respectively, under type θ b 2 , while the parenthesis in blue after the semicolon presents the payoff of P 1 , P 2 , respectively, under type θ g 2 .
A. Initial Stage
As shown in Fig. 1 , the intelligence from the reconnaissance stage supports APTs to gain initial entry through physical access, web phishing, and social engineering. For example, the Stuxnet virus enters Iran's Natanz nuclear facility through a USB from hacked suppliers during the hardware upgrade [1] . The intelligence related to these hardware vendors plays an essential role in bridging the air gap and compromising the nuclear facility. Similarly, knowing internal codes or jargon can make a spoofing email more credible and [21] has shown how a social engineer can collect a series of petty information to manipulate employees for confidential information and malware installations. Since 91% of cyber attacks start with a phishing email [22] , we consider the web phishing as the initial infection.
A binary state space X 0 = {0, 1} summarizes the reconnaissance outcome. The attacker who conducts thorough reconnaissance can send phishing emails from an internal network domain x 0 = 1 while ineffectual reconnaissance results in emails from an external IP domain, denoted by x 0 = 0. To penalize the adversarial exploitation of the open-source intelligence (OSINT) data [23] , the defender can create avatars (fake personal profiles) on the social network or the company website.
Both players have three actions at the initial stage, i.e., A 0 i = {0, 1, 2} where the user can send an email to an entry-level employee a 0 2 = 0, a manager a 0 2 = 1, or the avatar a 0 2 = 2. Security training is useful to confront web phishing. For example, after receiving an email with unexpected links or attachments, the employee and the manager should be aware of the potential risk and request a digital signature from the sender before clicking the link or opening the attachment. Since employees' awareness and alertness diminish over time, the security training needs to be repeated at reasonable intervals [21] , which can be costly. With a limited budget, the defender can choose to educate entry-level employees a 0 1 = 1, manager-level employees a 0 1 = 2, or no training a 0 1 = 0 to avoid the prohibitive training cost
The defender of highawareness θ H 1 holds the security training with a higher frequency, which incurs a higher cost c 0 H > c 0 L , but is also more effective in mitigating web phishing, i.e.,
and the utility matrix of the initial infection is given in Table I . Fig. 2: The diagram of the cyber state transition and the physical attack via the compromise of the SCADA system. APTs can damage the normal industrial operation by falsifying controllers' setpoints, tampering sensor readings, and blocking communication channels to cause delays in either the control message or the sensing data.
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TABLE I: The utility matrix (J 0 θ 2 ) ). The payoffs are in red under type θ b 2 while in blue under θ g 2 .
B. Intermediate Stage
The state x 1 can be interpreted as the location of the attacker at the intermediate stage k = 1 where x 1 = 0 refers to the honeypot, x 1 = 1 refers to the employee's computer, and x 1 = 2 refers to the manager's computer. The user can choose a 1 2 = 1 to escalate his privileges, or choose a 1 2 = 0, i.e., 'No Operation Performed (NOP)'. The defender can choose to either restrict a 1 1 = 1 or allow a 1 1 = 0 the escalation as shown in Table II . The output state space X 2 = {0, 1, 2, 3} of the transition f 1 represents four different privilege levels from low to high, and both the action pair and the state x 1 ∈ {0, 1, 2} can affect x 2 . For example, if the user is at the honeypot state x 1 = 0, then he ends up with a level-zero privilege x 2 = 0 whatever actions he takes. If the user reaches the manager's computer x 1 = 2, he can request for a higher privilege level and arrive at a more favorable state x 2 than from the entry-level employee's computer x 1 = 1.
C. Final Stage
We resort to the simulation model in [24] to quantify monetary losses of the TE process under sensor compromises. The TE process involves two irreversible reactions to produce two liquid (liq) products G, H from four gaseous (g) reactants A,C, D, E as shown in Fig. 2 . The control objective is to maintain a desired production rate as well as quality while stabilizing the whole system under the Gaussian noise to avoid violating safety constraints such as a high reactor pressure, a high reactor temperature, and a high/low separator/stripper liquid level.
1) Performance Metric: Previous studies on the security of the TE process have mostly focused on the shortest shutdown time (SDT) [25] , or a violation of a setpoint, e.g., the reactor pressure exceeds 3, 000 kpa [26] . These attacks trigger the safety alarm and successfully cause the shutdown of the plant. A few days of shutdowns would incur a considerable financial loss. However, the shutdown also reveals the attacker and leads to an update of defensive strategies. Thus, it becomes harder for the same kind of attacks to succeed after the plant recovers from the shutdown.
In our APT scenario, the attacker focuses on decreasing the operation efficiency of the plant, i.e., attackers aim to stealthily deviate the normal operation state of the plant without triggering the safety alarm or shutting down the plant. Then, the plant operates at a non-optimal state with reduced utilities.
The following economic metrics quantify the utility of the plant under different states of sensor compromise:
• Hourly operation cost C o with the unit ($/h) is taken as the sum of purge costs, product stream costs, compressor costs, and stripper steam costs.
• Production rate R p with the unit (m 3 /h) is the volume of total products per hour.
• Quality of products Q p with the unit (G mole%), is the percentage of G among total products.
• P G with the unit ($/m 3 ) is the price of product G. The utility per hour U T E is computed as follows:
2) Attack Model: An attack model includes two separate parts, information and capacity. First, the information available to the attacker such as sensor measurements can affect the performance of the attack. For example, observing the input rate of the raw material in the TE process is less beneficial for the attacker than the direct measurements of P G , R p , Q p ,C o that affect the utility metric in (11) . Second, attackers can have different capacities in accessing and revising controllers and sensors. An attacker may change the parameters of the PID controller, directly falsify the controller output, or indirectly deviate the setpoint by tampering, blocking or delaying sensor readings.
In this experiment, we assume a sensor data manipulation of sensor XMEAS(40) and XMEAS (17) in loop 8 and loop 13 of TE process, respectively [27] . Sensor XMEAS(40) measures the composition of component G and sensor XMEAS(17) measures the stripper underflow. A higher privilege state x 2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} means that the user can access more sensors for a longer time. Fig.  3 shows the variation of U T E versus the simulation time under four different privilege states. The attacker compromises the sensor and generates false readings. The fake reading can be a constant, denoted by the blue line, or a double of the real readings, denoted by the red or green lines. The pink line represents a composition attack with a limited control time. Initially, the attacker manages to compromise both sensors by doubling their readings. After the attacker loses access to XMEAS(40) at the 6 th hour, the system is sufficiently resilient to recover partially in about 16 hours and achieve the same level of utility as the single attack in green. When the attacker also loses access to XMEAS (17) at the 36 th hour, the utility goes back to normal in about 13 hours.
3) Utility Matrix: At the final stage k = 2, the user chooses to gain access to the sensor a 2 2 = 1 or not a 2 2 = 0, and the defender chooses to monitor a 2 1 = 1 or not
as the monitoring reward for two types of systems where r 2 H > r 2 L > c 2 > 0. As shown in Table III , an implementation of the monitor system costs c 2 yet can bring a payoff of r 2 − c 2 in detecting sensor compromises. We use the time average of these utilities to obtain the normal operation utility r 2 4 and utilities under four different states of attacks r 2 1 (x 2 ), ∀x 2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, in Table III . 
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section presents results and insights from the case study. We focus on the SBNE of the final-stage game in VI-A and the PBNE of the multistage game in VI-B.
A. Final Stage and SBNE
Players' beliefs affect their policies and the expected utility at the final stage. We discuss three different scenarios as follows. In Fig 4, we plot both players' strategies and utilities when the user knows that the defender is of the primitive type, yet the primitive defender only knows the probability of the user being adversarial. In Fig. 5 , we study the case where the primitive defender knows that the user is adversarial while the adversarial user only knows the probability of the system being primitive. In Fig. 6 , we show the plots where both players' types are private, and each player only knows the probability of the other player's type. In all three scenarios, the x-axis represents the belief at state x 2 = 3. In particular, the x-axis in Fig.  4 or 6 represents the percentage of attackers among all users or equivalently, the probability of the user being adversarial. Correspondingly, the x-axis in Fig. 5 can represent either the percentage or the probability of the sophisticated system. Fig. 4 shows the following trends as the user becomes more likely to be adversarial. First, two black lines show that the expected utility of the system decreases and the defender is more inclined to monitor after her belief exceeds a threshold. Second, two red lines show that the adversarial user takes action 'NOP' with a higher probability and only gains a reward when the percentage of adversarial users is sufficiently low. Thus, we conclude that when the attack's percentage increases, the defender tends to invest more in cyber defense so that the attacker behaves more conservatively and inflicts fewer losses. Third, the two blue lines show that the legitimate user always accesses the sensor and receives a constant utility, which indicates that the proactive defense does not affect the behavior and the utility of legitimate users. Fig. 5 shows that a system benefits from introducing uncertainties. When the system becomes more likely to be the sophisticated type θ H 1 , both types of systems can have a higher probability not to monitor and save the surveillance cost. The attacker with incomplete information has a threshold policy and switches to a lower attacking probability after reaching the threshold of 0.5 as shown in the black line. When the probability goes beyond the threshold, the system of the primitive type θ L 1 can pretend to be of the sophisticated type θ H 1 and take action 'NOP'. Meanwhile, a system of type θ H 1 can reduce the security effort and take action 'NOP' with a higher probability since the attacker becomes more cautious in taking adversarial actions after identifying the system as more likely of type θ H 1 . It is also observed that the system of type θ H 1 receives a higher payoff before the attacker's belief reaches the 0.5 threshold. After the belief reaches the threshold, the attacker is threatened to take less aggressive actions, and both types of systems share the same payoff. Finally, we consider the double-sided incomplete information where both players' types are private information, and each player only has the belief of the other player's type. Compared with the defender in Fig. 4 who takes action 'NOP' with a probability less than 0.5 and receives a decreasing expected payoff, the defender in Fig. 6 can take 'NOP' with a probability closed to 1 and receive a constant payoff in expectation after the user's belief exceeds the threshold. Thus, the defender can spare defense efforts and mitigate risks by introducing uncertainties on her type as a countermeasure to the adversarial deception. 1) Sensitivity Analysis: As shown in Fig. 7 , if the value of the penalty r 2 L is close to 0, i.e., the defense at the final stage is ineffective, then an arrival at state x 2 = 3 and the highest privilege level can significantly increase the attacker's utility and cause the most damage to the system. As more effective defensive methods are employed at the final stage and the value of r 2 L increases, the attacker becomes more conservative and strategic in taking adversarial behaviors. Then, the state with the highest privilege level may not be the most favorable state for the attacker. 
B. Multistage and PBNE
We show in Fig. 8 that the Bayesian belief update leads to a more accurate estimate of users' types. Without the belief update, the posterior belief is the same as the prior belief in red and is used as the baseline. As the prior belief increases in the x-axis, the posterior belief after the Bayesian update also increases in blue. The blue line is in general above the red line, which means that with the Bayesian update, the system's belief becomes closer to the right type. Also, we find that the belief update is the most effective when an inaccurate prior belief is used as it corrects the erroneous belief significantly.
In Fig. 9 , we show that the proactive defense, i.e., defensive methods in intermediate stages can affect the state transition and reduce the probability of attackers reaching states that can result in huge damages at the final stage. As the prior belief of the user being adversarial increases, the attacker is more likely to arrive at state x 2 = 0 and x 2 = 1, and reduce the probability of visiting x 2 = 2 and x 2 = 3.
1) Adversarial and Defensive Deception: Fig. 10 investigates the adversarial deception where the attacker takes full control of the system and manipulates the defender's belief. As shown in Fig. 10 , the system utilities all increase when the belief under the deception approaches the correct belief that the user is adversarial. Also, the increase is stair-wise, i.e., the defender only alternates her policy when the manipulated belief is beyond certain thresholds. Under the same manipulated belief, a sophisticated defender θ H 1 benefits no less than a primitive defender θ L 1 . The defender receives a higher payoff when the attacker starts from the external state x 0 = 0 rather than the internal state x 0 = 1.
Incapable of identifying the adversarial deception, the defender can alternatively introduce defensive deceptions, e.g., a primitive defender can disguise itself as a sophisticated one to confuse the attacker. Defensive deceptions introduce uncertainties to attackers, increase their costs, and increase the system utility. Fig. 11 investigates the system's and attackers' utilities under three different scenarios. The complete information refers to the scenario where both players know the other player's type. The deception with the H-type or the L-type means that the attacker knows the defender's type to be θ H 1 or θ L 1 , respectively, yet the defender has no information about the user's type. The double-sided deception indicates that both players do not know the other player's type. The results from Fig. 11 are summarized as follows. First, the defender's payoffs under type θ H 1 can increase as much as 56% than those under type θ L 1 . Also, prevention of the attacker from entering the internal network x 0 = 1 increases the defender's utility by as much as 41% and reduces the attacker's utility by as much as 38%. Second, the defender and the attacker receive the highest and the lowest payoff, respectively, under the complete information. When the attacker introduces deceptions over his type, the attacker's utility increases and the system utility decreases. Third, when the defender adopts defensive deceptions to introduce double-sided incomplete information, we find that the decrease of system utilities is reduced by at most 64%, i.e., the decrease of system utilities changes from $55, 570 to $35, 570 under the internal state and type θ H 1 . The double-sided incomplete information also brings lower utilities to the attacker than the one-sided adversarial deception. However, the system utility under the double-sided deception is still less than the complete information case, which concludes that acquiring complete information of the adversarial user is the most effective defense. However, if the complete information cannot be obtained, the defender can mitigate her loss by introducing defensive deceptions.
VII. CONCLUSION
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are emerging security challenges for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) as the attacker can stealthily enter, persistently stay in, and strategically interact with the system. In this work, we have developed a game-theoretic framework to design proactive and cross-layer defenses for CPSs in a holistic Fig. 11 : The cumulative utilities of the attacker and the defender under the complete information, the adversarial deception, and the defensive deception. In the legend, the left three represent the utilities for a system of type θ H 1 and the right three represent the ones for a system of type θ L 1 .
manner. Dynamic games of incomplete information have been used to capture the long-term interaction between users and defenders who have private information unknown to the other player. Each player forms a belief on the unknowns and uses a Bayesian update to learn the private information and reduce the uncertainties. The analysis of the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) has provided the defender with an effective countermeasure against the stealthy strategic attacks at multiple stages. To compute the PBNE of the dynamic games, we have proposed a nested algorithm that iteratively alternates between the forward belief update and the backward policy computation. The algorithm has been shown to quickly converge to the ε-PBNE that yields a consistent pair of beliefs and policies. Using a Tennessee Eastman (TE) process as a case study of industrial control systems, we have shown that proactive multistage defenses in cyber networks can successfully mitigate the risk of physical attacks without reducing the payoffs of legitimate users. In particular, experiment results show that a sophisticated defender receives a payoff up to 56% higher than a primitive defender does. Also, it has been illustrated that by preventing the attacker from entering the internal network, the defender increases her utility and reduces the attacker's utility by at most 41% and 38%, respectively. On one hand, the attacker receives a higher payoff after introducing adversarial deceptions which increase defender's uncertainties. On the other hand, by also creating uncertainties for attackers, the defender can successfully threaten them to take more conservative behaviors and also become less motivated to launch attacks. It has been shown that the system significantly benefits from mitigation of losses after the defender adopts defensive deceptions.
The future work would extend the framework to an N-person game to characterize the interactions among different types of users and model composition attacks. We would also consider the scheme where players' actions and the system state are partially observable.
